g) Given that it is very unlikely that the calculation of 35%. For each category of vessels, tonnages must be indicated exactly by the maximum tonnage allowed for vessels in this category, and adjustments may be necessary to ensure that Germany is not excluded from the full use of its tonnage. It was therefore agreed that the German Government and Her Majesty`s Government in the United Kingdom would agree on the necessary accommodations to do so and it is considered that this procedure will not result in a substantial or permanent deviation from the 35:100 ratio to overall levels. ww2dbase In mid-1935, amid protests by a small group of “alarmists” such as Sir John Simon and Winston Churchill, Germany and Great Britain participated in the Anglo-German naval agreement. With this agreement, Britain left out all the maritime restrictions imposed by the Treaty of Versaille and, without consulting France, Britain authorized Germany to create a naval force that should not exceed 35% of its own, while agreeing to withdraw the British Royal Navy from the Baltic Sea. It was one of the most important examples of the British appeasement policy of the time. For members of the British Parliament, this seemed to continue to maintain Britain`s status as the dominant maritime power in the world, but many did not realize that Britain had an empire to defend, while the German fleet was concentrated close to its ports of origin. The agreement allowed Germany, up to 21 cruisers, 64 destroyers (although it did not build as many surface ships before invading Poland in 1939) and by misrepresentation or a false translation of the treaty, as many submarines as it wished. Churchill called the treaty a “term of credulity” and said Britain had “tolerated this unilateral violation of the Treaty of Versailles.” The Anglo-German naval agreement established a report in which the total tonnage of the Navy is expected to be permanently 35% of the total tonnage of the Royal Navy. [1] On July 12, 1935, he was registered in the League of Nations Treaty Series.

[2] The agreement was denounced by Adolf Hitler on April 28, 1939. As was one of the origins of the treaty, the deep cuts made to the Royal Navy after the 1921-22 Washington Naval Conference and the London Naval Conference in 1930. The cuts imposed by both conferences and the effects of the Great Depression led to the collapse of much of the British naval industry in the early 1930s. [9] This seriously hampered British naval armament efforts later in the decade, leading the Admiralty to consider contracts with quantitative and qualitative restrictions of potential enemies as the best way to ensure the Royal Navy`s maritime dominance. [10] Maiolo argues that it is in fact unseribly important whether potential enemies are intentionally isolating the size and extent of their navies. [11] In particular, Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the first lord of the sea between 1933 and 1938, defended such contracts.