When MEPs mentioned the agreement and what would avoid the rejection of the backstop, they were first defending only one part of the historic conflict – the Unionists` camp that supports Northern Ireland`s political ties with Britain. The agreement was concluded on 10 April 1998 and addressed, among other key issues, these key issues: the direct domination of London ended in Northern Ireland when power was formally transferred to the new Northern Ireland Assembly, the North-South Council and the Anglo-Irish Council, when the opening decisions of the Anglo-Irish Agreement came into force on 2 December 1999. [15] [16] [17] Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement (the agreement between the British and Irish governments on the implementation of the Belfast Agreement) required both governments to inquire in writing about compliance with the terms of entry into force of the Anglo-Irish Agreement; The latter is expected to come into effect as soon as both notifications are received. [18] The British government has agreed to participate in a televised ceremony at Iveagh House in Dublin, the Irish Foreign Office. Peter Mandelson, Minister of Northern Ireland, participated in his participation in early December 2, 1999. He exchanged notifications with David Andrews, the Irish Foreign Secretary. Shortly after the ceremony, at 10:30 a.m., the Taoiseach, Bertie Ahern, signed the declaration of formal amendment of Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. He then informed the D`il that the Anglo-Irish agreement had entered into force (including some endorsements to the Belfast Agreement). [7] [19] The main themes addressed by Sunningdale and dealt with in the Belfast Agreement are the principle of self-determination, the recognition of the two national identities, Anglo-Irish intergovernmental cooperation and legal procedures for compulsory power-sharing, such as inter-community voting and the D`Hondt system for appointing ministers to the executive.

[24] [25] Former IRA member and journalist Tommy McKearney says the main difference is the British government`s intention to negotiate a comprehensive agreement including the IRA and the most intransigent unionists. [26] With regard to the right to self-determination, two qualifications are recorded by the writer Austen Morgan. First, the transfer of territory from one state to another must be done through an international agreement between the British and Irish governments. Second, the population of Northern Ireland can no longer be alone in united Ireland; They need not only the Irish government, but also the people of their neighbouring country, Ireland, to support unity. Mr Morgan also pointed out that, unlike the Irish Act 1949 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973, drawn up under Sunningdale, the 1998 agreement and the resulting British legislation explicitly provide for the possibility of a unified Ireland. [27] As Jonathan Powell, one of Britain`s leading negotiators in the peace talks, put it, a soft border meant “that the question of identity was really ruled out.” It was not a small feat in a place where the identity of Irish/nationalist or British/Unionist made history, where you live, who you married and where you worked. Update (16 Feb 18). I added a section under Brexiters (section 4) with some articles on Sweden-Norway and possible technical solutions at the hard border. Since the beginning of 2018, many Brexiters have been promoting it on paper and online and citing sections of “Smart Border 2.0” (see section 1). Sinn Fein has said that any hard border in Ireland would lead to new demands for a referendum on the Irish deal and insists that a border poll be conducted in Northern Ireland if there is a Brexit without a deal.